You know, America has been suffering under a wave of technological outages. In response, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who also serves as National Security Advisor, told the press in a statement that there is no evidence the outages are linked to cyberattacks or “nefarious actors.” He said in his statement:
I wanted to come here today, this morning, to offer just full transparency on what we know as a government and how we view these events. The first thing I want to make very clear is that we have zero evidence whatsoever, we have no indication, no evidence, and no reason to believe at all that any of these incidents are related to each other. In essence, the Microsoft incident has nothing to do with what we saw with the FAA; the FAA has nothing to do with what we saw with the banks a few days ago. These issues that have – we’ve seen from a technical standpoint are completely unrelated one from another. That is what we have seen. That’s what all the evidence indicates. That’s what all our information indicates. And to this point, we have absolutely no reason to believe otherwise, that these things are related in any way.
The second is that we have zero evidence or any reason to believe that any of these isolated or individual instances have anything to do with nefarious actors, with cyber hackers, with criminals, with another nation-state, with a malign actor of any kind. Again, we have no evidence of that. We have no indications of that. We have no reason to believe that.
So, the two points that I wanted – the three points I want to drive is the first, we fully acknowledge that this is unsettling to see these reports day after day of some technical failures. We get it. In our own lives, we see it the same way, and obviously you have questions, and we’re asking the right questions and believe getting the right answers. Number two, the second point is while acknowledging that, we want everyone in America to know that we have absolutely no reason to believe, we have no evidence, no indications of any kind that these – that these incidents are related to each other or that any of them have anything to do with a malign actor, with a cybercriminal, with a disgruntled former employee, with anything along those lines. Each of them are distinct and they’re different in their causation, in some cases highly technical in ways that I would refer you to the companies impacted to describe to you further, and others in ways that the FAA and Secretary Duffy has already described to you in previous briefings and interactions.
The Director of National Intelligence, Jay Clayton, echoed Rubio’s assessment in an interview with Fox Business, explaining that he did not see the indication that the outages and issues over the last week were cyberattacks. Watch:
How Much Worse Would a Cyberattack Be?
If these problems aren’t being caused by an attack, is the set of systems that runs the lives of most Americans just that fragile? Does that make the outages worse? How bad would it be if there were an actual attack?
First, let’s be clear. There are many instances of cyberattacks coming from countries that the United States doesn’t normally get along with. The top offenders are China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. And between 2012 and 2025, there are 47 major attacks attributed to these countries by a Congressional Research Service report. Those attacks include:
Cyberattack Campaigns Attributed to Nation States
In Descending Order by Campaign Year: 2025-2012
| Incident/ Campaign Year(s) | Attributed Country | Perpetrating Entity | Campaign, Incident, or Identifier | Description |
| 2022-2025 | Russia | GRU | APT-28 | Targeting of companies supporting logistics and delivery of foreign aid and assistance to Ukraine. |
| 2018-2025 | Russia | Cyber Army of Russia Reborn | CARR | Cyberattacks against critical infrastructure and DDoS attacks. |
| 2024 | China | N/A | Salt Typhoon | State-sponsored actors compromised telecommunications companies to steal customer communications. |
| 2024 | China | N/A | Flax Typhoon | State-sponsored actors targeted internet-connected devices (e.g., cameras and storage devices) to create a botnet, from which they could carry out other attacks. |
| 2023-2024 | China | N/A | Volt Typhoon | State-sponsored actors compromised critical infrastructure as part of a campaign to gain access in order to disrupt critical infrastructure if ordered to do so in the future. |
| 2023 | China | N/A | BlackTech | Compromised internet connected devices (e.g., routers) to use in targeting the United States and Japan with cyberattacks. |
| 2023 | Russia | SVR | APT-29 | Infiltrated an information technology company to exploit supply chain trust. |
| 2022-2023 | North Korea | N/A | N/A | Conducted ransomware attacks against healthcare organizations. |
| 2021-2023 | North Korea | N/A | N/A | Deceived IT companies into hiring North Korean workers for remote jobs in order to generate funds for state programs. |
| 2020-2023 | North Korea | RGB | APT-38 | Targeted companies using blockchain technologies (e.g., cryptocurrencies and non-fungible tokens) to steal money. |
| 2019-2023 | Russia | FSB | Star Blizzard | Used spear-phishing to target individuals and organizations. |
| 2021-2023 | North Korea | RGB | N/A | Used spear-phishing in intelligence collection operations. |
| 2016-2023 | China | MSS | Apt-27 | Freelancer acted at the direction of the state to steal data on organizations in the United States. |
| 2003-2023 | Russia | FSB | Snake | Conducted long-term surveillance of NATO countries. |
| 2022 | Russia | Undisclosed | N/A | State-sponsored actors exploited multi-factor authentication misconfigurations to steal data. |
| 2022 | Iran | N/A | Log4Shell | Government-sponsored actors exploited open-source vulnerabilities in network connection software to install crypto-mining software and steal credentials. |
| 2022 | Iran | IRGC | CyberAveng3rs | State-sponsored actors targeted industrial control systems of critical infrastructure. |
| 2020-2022 | Russia | Undisclosed | N/A | State-sponsored actors targeted cleared defense contractors to steal weapons and vehicle research, and spy on communications. |
| 2018-2022 | Iran | MOIS | N/A | Government actors spied on and stole data from private-sector organizations in the telecommunications, defense, and energy sectors, as well as governmental entities. |
| 2021-2022 | North Korea | Undisclosed | Maui Ransomware | Government-sponsored actors targeted health care companies with ransomware. |
| 2021 | Russia | GRU | Cisco Router Malware | Russian military intelligence compromised widely used internet network equipment to spy on victims and spread malware. |
| 2021 | Iran | N/A | N/A | Government-sponsored actors exploited vulnerabilities in email and security appliances to gain access to U.S. critical infrastructure. Once they had access, they conducted follow-on theft, encryption, ransomware and extortion operations. |
| 2020-2021 | China | MSS | Hafnium | Exploited previously unknown vulnerabilities in on-premise Microsoft Exchange servers to gain access to sensitive data. |
| 2020-2021 | Russia | SVR | SolarWinds | Conducted a supply-chain attack against a widely used software management company to gain access to government and private-sector networks. |
| 2020 | Iran | Kazemi and Kashiana | 2020 U.S. Presidential Election Disinformation and Election Infrastructure Hacking | Hacked into state election websites and accessed voter information on over 100,000 citizens. Sent disinformation to politicians and the media claiming to be from voters. Intimidated voters online. Attempted to hack into a media company to spread further disinformation. |
| 2020 | Iran | MOIS & IRGC | APT-39 | Stole data pertaining to national security, foreign policy intelligence, non-military nuclear information, aerospace data, human rights activist information, individual financial information and PII, and intellectual property, including unpublished scientific research. |
| 2014-2020 | China | MSS | APT-41 | Targeted IT companies, telecommunications companies, academic institutions, NGOs, and pro-democracy activists to steal intellectual property; deployed ransomware; and used illegally accessed computers to mine cryptocurrency. |
| 2014-2020 | North Korea | RGB | APT-38 | Destroyed computers of Sony Pictures Entertainment over the release of The Interview; compromised the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) network to steal money from banks; created and deployed the WannaCry 2.0 ransomware; created malicious cryptocurrency wallets; compromised cryptocurrency companies to steal cryptocurrencies; and conducted spear phishing campaigns against defense contractors, energy companies, aerospace companies, technology companies, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department of Defense. |
| 2013-2020 | Iran | Criminal group operating on behalf of the state | N/A | Targeted universities, think tanks, defense contractors, and aerospace companies to steal sensitive data. |
| 2009-2020 | China | MSS | N/A | Targeted technology manufacturing, health care, energy, defense, business, educational, and gaming companies to steal intellectual property and confidential business information, including COVID-19 research. |
| 2015-2019 | Iran | IRGC | APT-33 | Conducted spear phishing attacks against satellite and aerospace company employees to gain access to company networks, steal identities, and use malware to steal intellectual property and sensitive data. |
| 2015-2018 | Russia | GRU | Sandworm | Attacked the Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure (BlackEnergy); sought to interfere in the French national elections; conducted the NotPetya attacks against U.S.-based hospitals, shipping companies, and pharmaceutical companies; sought to undermine the PyeongChang Winter Olympics; spear phished investigators of the Novichok poisoning to gain sensitive data; and sought to compromise Georgian government entities. |
| 2014-2018 | Russia | GRU | N/A | Conducted disinformation operations. Hacked into computers belonging to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), Rio de Janeiro Olympic and Paralympic games, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Westinghouse Electric Company’s (WEC), and the [Organization] for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Published stolen and altered information from these entities to retaliate for and delegitimize doping charges against Russia’s sporting organizations. |
| 2013-2018 | Iran | IRGC | Mabna Institute | Stole academic data and intellectual property from universities, companies, and government agencies. |
| 2012-2018 | Russia | FSB | N/A | Targeted the operational technology of energy sector companies in 135 countries. |
| 2011-2018 | China | MSS | APT-40 | Stole the intellectual property of companies dealing with submersibles, autonomous vehicles, chemicals, aircraft, genetics, transportation, and infectious disease research. |
| 2006-2018 | China | MSS | APT-10 | Targeted and stole intellectual property and confidential business information from transportation, technology, shipping, consulting, health care, and energy companies through cloud and managed service providers. |
| 2017 | China | PLA | Equifax Hack | Theft of the PII of nearly 150 million Americans. |
| 2016 | Russia | GRU | DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 | Targeted political campaigns, state boards of elections, state secretaries of state, and companies providing technology for elections to steal and leak their sensitive data. |
| 2014-2016 | Russia | FSB | Yahoo Breach | Breach of 500 million accounts and other webmail account compromises targeted journalists, government officials, cybersecurity company employees, financial services companies, and transportation companies to steal sensitive information. |
| 2015 | China | Fujie Wang, and others | Anthem Hack | Stole massive amounts of PII held by the health insurance company Anthem Inc., as well as other companies. |
| 2014-2015 | Iran | IRGC | N/A | Targeted intelligence community (IC) employees as part of an intelligence campaign with fake accounts used to deploy malware. |
| 2014-2015 | China | N/A | N/A | Stole proprietary source code to provide to national industries in China. |
| 2010-2015 | China | MSS | N/A | Targeted aerospace companies to steal intellectual property related to turbofan engine technology. |
| 2006-2014 | China | PLA | N/A | Hacked into computers of U.S. manufacturers in order to steal sensitive information to benefit Chinese state enterprises. |
| 2008-2014 | China | N/A | N/A | Company insider threat stole sensitive jet engine technology information to smuggle it to China. |
| 2011-2013 | Iran | ITSecTeam and Mersad Company | N/A | Waged DDOS attacks against financial services companies, and hacked into networks of a municipal dam in Rye Brook, NY. |
What About Attacks Using Artificial Intelligence?
With a span of 2012-2025, many of these attacks can be considered before the era of artificial intelligence. According to the American Security Project (ASP), since 2022, AI-assisted cyberattacks have risen 2,200%. In ASP’s report Cloud of War: The AI Cyber Threat to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, the authors explain:
An API query of open-source Python repository PyPI finds that total downloads of AI-assisted offensive cyber software exceeded 21.4 million from March to September 2025.30 These toolkits are often legitimately used by cybersecurity experts to probe for novel vulnerabilities and stress-test software they are tasked with defending. However, a rising number of packages—several hundred as of September 22nd—openly advertise that they can be executed against systems not owned by the downloader to cause real-world harms. These AI malware executables have been downloaded more than 12 million times in the past six months.
While preliminary, these findings are startling— particularly considering this analysis did not include AI penetration agents from other open-source repositories like GitHub or private malware-sharing communities on apps like Discord, Telegram, or Signal. According to industry insiders, these platforms produce an estimated 60% of all offensive AI cyber agents. As a result, these findings are a highly conservative estimate of the rising popularity of AI malware agents compared to traditional malware shared online, with autonomous malware executables likely exceeding 20 million or more downloads over the past six months.
In a stark contrast to the overall decline in traditional malware sharing, the popularity of agentic cyber penetration agents is increasing exponentially. From April to September 2025, monthly downloads of open-source AI-assisted offensive cyber suites rose from 2.6 million to 3.9 million, a 49.3% increase in just six months. According to AV Atlas, a threat intelligence firm that monitors malware shared online, monthly shares of written malware declined from 11 million in March to 6.5 million in August 2025. Consequently, the ratio of offensive AI cyber agent downloads to written malware files shared online increased from .25 to .54 in the six months from March to September, demonstrating that downloads of offensive AI cyber agents may be supplementing or even partially replacing traditional malware sharing mechanisms.
What Can You Do to Protect Yourself from a Major Cyberattack on America?
With the rise in AI-driven cyberattacks, what can you do to protect yourself? Here are some of the best ways you can improve your online safety.
- Avoid phishing attacks. Phishing is a technique hackers (or AI-powered agentic hackers) use to trick you into clicking on links that install harmful software on your computer. Don’t click on links from strange or unexpected emails. Be wary of websites that ask for sensitive information.
- Use strong passwords. The longer and more original the better. Better yet, use passkeys if you can. And where you can, setup multi-factor authentication (MFA). Many attacks can be stopped by MFA.
- Update your software. Don’t skip software updates. Tech firms are racing to patch your software to prevent AI hacks. Help them succeed by running those updates.
- Encrypt your data. There are a number of encryption tools available. Use them where you can.
- Don’t use public WiFi. Your Survival Guy gets it. Airport internet isn’t great. The temptation to check your email during your layover is high. But protect yourself by not using public WiFi.
- Monitor your accounts. This is a “the horse has already left the barn” suggestion. If you see problems in your accounts, the damage has already been done, but the sooner you can clean it up, the better. Get that horse back in the barn, ASAP.
What About AI Cyberattacks on Infrastructure?
You just learned how you can protect your own data, but the rubber really meets the road when AI cyberattacks hit critical infrastructure. So what can you do today, to make that scenario better for your own family?
- Paper still works. Put your passwords and accounts down on paper, and keep those records in your safe.
- Food and water. You know Your Survival Guy wants you to store food and water. Go back and read my special reports on both topics.
- Emergency cash. Keep cash, and some gold on hand.
What Else Can I Do?
Action Line: If you have been reading Your Survival Guy, you know there’s a lot more that can be done. But don’t overwhelm yourself. Start small, and make a big difference. Don’t forget to prepare your investments. When you want help, email me at ejsmith@yoursurvivalguy.com. And click here to learn more by subscribing to my free monthly Survive & Thrive letter.
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